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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis investigates why the EU has changed its response to the rise of the populist 
radical right within its member states through a case study of Austria. Within the timeframe 
of the 2000 and 2017 Austrian elections, this thesis reveals that due to a number of 
international events and trends, the populist radical right has been increasingly empowered 
and legitimized as mainstream. It demonstrates that through this legitimization, the political 
ideology of the populist radical right has influenced European politics on a national and 
cross-regional level. This consequentially has led to a change in approach to the rise of such 
politics in member states by the EU, specifically Austria, and illustrates a difficult debacle for 
the EU with regards to its integrity.  
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Introduction 
 
On December 16th 2017, Austria witnessed a historic election, which resulted in the nation’s 
centre right People’s Party (ÖVP) establishing a coalition with its populist radical right 
Freedom Party (FPÖ). Shortly after their victory, Nigel Farage tweeted “In 2000 I sat in a 
European Parliament that wanted sanctions on Austria because the Freedom Party was in 
coalition government. It’s now the same situation in 2017 and no one says a word. 
Eurosceptic politics is now mainstream.”1 Despite the aim of the tweet likely being 
provocative rather than political analysis, his statement was not incorrect. Less than two 
decades since major concerns arose with the success of the FPÖ, the perceived threat and the 
response to the rise of the populist radical right within the member states of the EU has 
altered drastically. Considering the magnitude of this political evolution, there has been too 
little discussion of this alteration in both the press and the EU itself. This thesis will explore 
the under considered question of why the EU has changed its response to the rise of the 
populist radical right within its member states. To study this change, Austria and its elections 
will serve as a case study to address this question. However, given the international nature of 
this issue, the case study will serve as an example for a larger, cross-regional analysis. The 
hypothesis of this thesis maintains that due to a number of identifiable occurrences, the 
perception of the populist radical right has been altered and its ideology and politics have 
been accepted, as Nigel Farage puts, as “mainstream”.2 In a short time span, the populist 
radical right in Europe has been legitimized and empowered, not only threatening the values 
of the EU but compelling this regional union to adapt. This thesis will shed light on the 
evolution of this change and the consequences of this new political norm within the EU.  
 
 
1 Georgi Gotev, “EU silently accepts far-right in Austrian cabinet.” Euroactiv, December 18, 2017.  
2 Ibid.  
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Since the fall of the Third Reich, Austria’s two large moderate parties; the ÖVP and 
the centre left Socialist Democrats (SPÖ), have predominantly ruled Austria, frequently in 
coalition governments. At the time of the national elections in 1999, the leader of the SPÖ, 
Victor Klima was the Chancellor of Austria whilst Wolfgang Schüssel, from the ÖVP, held 
the position of foreign minister.3 Previously unchallenged, this political system of ‘grand 
coalitions’ divided power between the two major parties, leaving little opportunity for 
others.4 This had started to change with the appointment of the divisive yet charismatic Jörg 
Haider in 1986 as party chairman for the populist radical right party, the Freedom Party 
(FPÖ).5 
 
The summer of 1999 had been politically, a noiseless one. Neither the SPÖ nor the 
ÖVP had suffered any significant scandals that could hinder their success in the upcoming 
election.6 The FPÖ had however recently suffered the embarrassing ‘Rosenstingl affair’ 
which involved a high ranking party member embezzling money from the party.7 General 
elections took place on October 3rd 1999, resulting in SPÖ receiving 33.2% of the votes and 
65 seats in parliament.8 The FPÖ, who had led a campaign centred on immigration and the 
condemnation of the elite political class, narrowly overtook the ÖVP with 26.9% and 52 
 
3 Wolfgang C. Müller, "The Austrian Election of October 1999: A Shift to the Right." West European 
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 2000): 192. 
4 Birgit Sauer and Edma Ajanovic. “Hegemonic Discourses of Difference and Inequality: Right-Wing 
Organisations in Austria” in The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Popular Shifts and ‘Othering’ 
edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani, Annie Benveniste (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 2016): 86. 
5 Freeman, Heather Berit. “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union 
Members’ Sanctions.” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. Vol. 25, No. 1 
(2002): 109. 
6 Müller, "The Austrian Election of October 1999: A Shift to the Right", 192. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Matthew Happold,  "Fourteen against One: The EU Member States' Response to Freedom Party 
Participation in the Austrian Government." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 
49, no. 4 (2000): 954. 
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seats.9 As is customary in the Austrian politics, a coalition of two or more parties was 
necessary to form a government. Negotiations between the SPÖ and ÖVP ensued to no avail 
and in January 2000, Klima acknowledged he was unsuccessful in his attempts to form a 
government.10 This gave way for Haider to start discussions with Schüssel and as early as 
February 1st, they effectively formed a coalition. In an unprecedented move, the reluctant 
president of Austria, Thomas Klestil, approved the coalition under the condition that both 
party leaders would publicly pledge their commitment to governing “an Austria in which 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and racism have no place.”11 The coalition government of the 
FPÖ and ÖVP were sworn in on February 5th 2000.12  
 
The other 14 member states of the European Union wasted no time in arranging 
political consequences. As early as late January, before the coalition was officially formed, 
the 14 members co-organized a protest with the support of the Portuguese Presidency of the 
Council of the EU against the coalition, accusing the government of violating the 
fundamental values of the EU as stated in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).13 The EU collectively condemned the new Austrian government and bilateral 
relations between member states and Austria were abruptly severed. The European 
community hoped these measures would prevent the coalition between ÖVP and the FPÖ 
however, this proved to be futile.14 The political consequences transcended European 
borders, evident as the Israeli government recalled their ambassador from Vienna indefinitely 
 
9 Müller, "The Austrian Election of October 1999: A Shift to the Right", 198. 
10 Happold, "Fourteen against One", 954. 
11 “Far right takes power in Austria,” The Guardian, February 4, 2000.  
12 Happold, "Fourteen against One", 954. 
13 Ulfgard, Rebecka. “Norm Consolidation in the European Union: The EU14-Austria Crisis in 2000.” 
Acta Wexionensia No. 75 (2005): 14.  
14 Freeman, “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members’ Sanctions.” 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. Volume 25, no. 1 (2002): 119. 
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and America likewise temporarily withdrew their diplomatic representative.15 In addition to 
the largely symbolic yet embarrassing sanctions, the EU established a committee to monitor 
and report on the Austrian government’s commitment to human rights and European values 
and moreover to investigate the “political nature of the Freedom Party of Austria.”16 In 
September of that year, the report confirmed Austria’s commitment to democratic values and 
the integrity of its democratic institutions. Consequently the sanctions were officially lifted 
only a few days later.17  
 
Despite the unprecedented reactions of the EU, the disgrace of the sanctions quickly 
became history in Austria and by 2006 the political status quo of centre party coalitions had 
returned. However, this was temporary. The Austrian presidential elections of 2016, which 
had historically followed a similar pattern of politics of the parliamentary elections, showed 
that trust of the centre parties had begun to fracture, when candidates from both the ÖVP and 
SPÖ failed to succeed in passing through to the second round.18 In an unexpected turn, there 
was a standoff between the Green Party leader Alexander Van der Bellen and the FPÖ 
candidate, Norbert Hofer.19 While Van der Bellen was unexpectedly victorious, the close race 
set the scene for the next year’s parliamentary election.  The ÖVP, under the new leadership 
of the young and politically savvy Sebastian Kurz, emerged as the strongest party with 31.5% 
of the vote.20 The FPÖ did unsurprisingly well with 26%, allowing the two to form a 
coalition reaching a comfortable majority.21 Like in 2000, a ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was formed, 
 
15 Happold, Matthew. "Fourteen against One”, 955. 
16 Heinrich Neisser, "The Schüssel Years and the European Union." In The Schüssel Era in Austria, 
edited by Bischof Günter and Plasser Fritz, (New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2010). 
188. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Anita Bodlos and Carolina Plescia, “The 2017 Austrian snap election: a shift rightward.” West 
European Politics, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2018): 1355. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid: 1385. 
21 Ibid.  
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once again bringing a populist radical right party into the Austrian government. Yet, this time 
there was no reaction from the EU. When President Junker was asked on behalf of the 
European Commission if this coalition warranted another public condemnation and 
diplomatic or economic sanctions he curtly replied with: “The President of the Commission 
met with the Austrian Federal Chancellor Sebastian Kurz on 19 December 2017 in Brussels 
and expressed his conviction that this appears to be, on the basis of the governmental 
programme, a pro-European government. The Commission will judge the Austrian 
government — as any other government — on the basis of its actions.”22 This is a 
substantially different response than the one in 2000. As aforementioned, this thesis 
endeavours to investigate and question this change in response, where it has often been 
overlooked in academic literature in international relations and European politics. The 
difference in reactions to the Austrian elections signal a significant change of the political 
norm within the EU and it is imperative to understand this political evolution. 
 
Methodology  
 
Firstly, it is important to justify why I choose to focus solely on the response of the European 
Union towards the Austrian elections of 1999 and 2017. There have been other cases of EU 
member states with populist radical right governments violating EU values and principles 
with talk of Article 7 TEU being discussed or effectively enforced within this period. Article 
7, which will be further examined in the following section of this thesis, is an article which 
allows for “the suspension of certain rights of the member state who is found in breach of EU 
 
22 European Commission, Question for written answer E-006544/17 to the Commission, (October 18, 
2017) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qe/2017/006544/P8_RE(2017)006544_E
N.pdf. 
Larissa Sophie Wiegelmann                                      EU change response to populist radical right  
 9 
values.”23 I decided against looking at the case of Article 7 being invoked by the EU in 
regards to Hungary and Poland, as I would argue these qualify as dissimilar cases. Firstly, in 
the case of both Hungary and Poland, the EU responded to a series of legislative actions 
taken by the governments of both countries, deemed to breach EU values. This is remarkably 
different to the events in 2000 concerning Austria as the monitoring by the European Court of 
Human Rights and bi-lateral sanctions were enforced practically immediately after the FPÖ 
was sworn into government. The ÖVP and FPÖ had not yet made a single legislative action 
when the sanctions were imposed, demonstrating that the sanctions were implemented with 
ideological and normative intent, rather than as a response to policy making.  
 
Secondly, although referred to as an EU action, officially the EU did not invoke 
Article 7 TEU in the case of Austria as it was legally unable to, a difference which will be 
further addressed in the literature review. The ‘Austrian crisis’ triggered alterations made 
within Article 7 TEU which influenced its use in the case of Hungary and Poland, however 
that is a different thesis topic. The debate and development of EU law regarding breaches of 
EU values among member states is an interesting research topic, however only one aspect of 
this thesis. I also decided against including the rise of the populist radical right into a 
coalition government in Italy before and after the ‘Austrian crisis’ because it (surprisingly) 
did not generate much discussion within the EU or cause comparable repercussions. Simply 
put, I focus on Austria and their elections of 1999 and 2017 as a timeframe due to their 
comparability. Within this timeframe, Austria itself did not go through any major domestic 
change. However, the EU as a collective entity unquestionably did undergo considerable 
change in its political climate. The selected timeframe thus provides a clear interval to assess 
 
23 Maria-Cristina Solacolu, “Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – past, present and future.” 
Curierul judiciar, Issue no. 13 (2018): 76. 
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the impact of these events on the EU, the populist radical right and therefore the former’s 
approach to the latter.  
 
The method of process tracing will be used to investigate why the EU has changed its 
response. A useful methodology for tracing both social and political phenomena, process 
tracing “is defined as the empirical analysis of the hypothesized observable implications of 
alternative theoretical processes that purport to explain the outcome of a single case.”24 
Process tracing will allow me to outline the events which occurred between 2000 and 2017 
and their effect on the perception and acceptance of the populist radical right in mainstream 
politics and therefore the change in response from the EU. This thesis explores the societal, 
economic and political factors contributing to the change in reaction. It does not focus on 
potential factors beyond this scope, like digitalization and related development in social 
media, which likely contributed to the course of events or reinforced factors I am describing. 
Lastly, the primary sources used in this thesis mainly comprise of official EU documents, 
independent reports and the newspaper sources.  
Literature review 
 
The following literature review hopes to set the scene for the subsequent analysis by 
exploring the existing literature on the topic. In the first section, I will be investigating the 
legal aspect and the role of the EU in the sanctions against Austria in 2000 which so radically 
changed Austria’s youthful relationship with the EU. The secondary section will focus on the 
ideological classification and terminology of the FPÖ as a political party and others like it in 
order to fully conceptualize the category of politics we are discussing. Considering the 
 
24 Andrew Bennet, “Process Tracing,” in International Encyclopaedia of Political Science edited by 
Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino. (California: SAGE publication, 2011). 
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fragmented literature concerning this topic, it is important for the cohesion of this thesis to 
select the most appropriate term and justify why. Thirdly, the literature regarding the social 
and political repercussions of the EU sanctions is studied. Due to the contemporary nature of 
the 2017 Austrian elections, the literature is understandably limited. As a result of this, the 
focus of this literature review is primarily on earlier elections and their consequences.  
 
Literature on the EU  
 
Initially, it is necessary to clarify why I refer to the EU as a whole considering its structural 
differences and complexities. The European Union comprises seven different institutions 
however, for the purpose of this thesis, I will be largely referring to the EU as a whole. This 
is due to the fact that concerning punitive sanctions on member states if found in breach of 
EU values, five different actors within the European Union are involved. L. Besselink 
outlines the functions of all five institutions which concern themselves with any violation of 
EU principles; the Council, the European Council, member states, the European Commission 
and finally, the European Parliament.25 Separate institutions will be mentioned when relevant 
yet when mentioning the sanctions I will refer to them as an action coordinated by the EU as 
a single entity. The purpose of this is to avoid unnecessary deviation to matters not central to 
the thesis.   
 
In 1999, Austria’s history with the EU had been a brief one. Austria joined the EU 
four years earlier, after a referendum was held in 1994 revealing that 66.6% of Austrian 
citizens, a striking majority, were in favour of joining.26 The first five years of Austrian 
 
25 L. Besselink, “The Bite, the Bark and Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives.” 
Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 
2016): 10. 
26 Neisser, "The Schüssel Years and the European Union", 183. 
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membership went smoothly with Austria fully participating and immersing themselves in 
workings of the EU and its different institutions.27 In 2000, this relationship had severely 
changed. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the coalition of the FPÖ and ÖVP 
triggered a swift reaction from the EU and the further 14 member states in the form of 
sanctions. Three steps to be taken were announced; that “(1) the governments of the Fourteen 
would not "promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at [a] political level with an 
Austrian Government integrating the FPÖ;" (2) there would be "no support in favour of 
Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organizations;" and (3) "Austrian 
Ambassadors in EU capitals [would] only be received at the technical level.''28 The Austrian 
public reaction was understandably negative, with the majority disapproving of the EU 
sanctions.29 Gerda Falker argues that the decision to impose sanctions fuelled an “ ‘the 
outside world’ against ‘us Austrians’” mentality, playing into the propaganda of the FPÖ who 
had campaigned heavily against joining the EU.30 The new Austrian government was equally 
as outraged, immediately denouncing the political interference and accusing the EU of 
“unjustly reprimanding the whole Austrian nation” for a democratic election.31 
 
In addition to the sanctions and the ensuing Austrian embarrassment, a report was to 
be written on the political nature of the FPÖ and the integrity and stability of Austria’s 
democratic institutions. The President of the European Court of Human Rights, Luzius 
Wildhaber, selected what is known as the ‘Three Wise Men’ to conduct such a report; 
 
27 Ibid: 184 
28 Freeman “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members’ Sanctions,” 
118. 
29 Ibid: 122.  
30 Gerda Kalkner, “The EU14’s “Sanctions” Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense.” Journal of the 
European Union Studies Association [formerly the European Community Studies Association]) Vol. 
14, No. 1 (Winter 2001): 4. 
31 Bernd Schlipphak and Oliver Treib, “Playing the blame game on Brussels: the domestic effects of 
EU interventions against democratic backsliding.” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(2016): 357. 
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Professor Jochen Frowein, director of the esteemed Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public and International Law, Marti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland and Marcelino 
Oreja, former Spanish minister for foreign affairs.32 These renowned politicians and political 
scientists concluded their findings in a report released on September 8th 2000.33 They 
determined that the sanctions should be lifted as there was no evidence of an abuse of human 
rights and in fact the sanctions had been counterproductive by ostracizing the Austrian 
public.34 They did however heavily criticize the FPÖ for “methods of campaigning and for 
intimidation of political critics via litigation in court.”35 The sanctions were relieved in the 
following days. An obvious question is how this reaction to a democratic election within an 
EU member state was legal or even advised. For this, we must regress to the years leading up 
to the election.  
 
The process of accession to the European Union has always been a transparent one. It 
has emphasized that any prospective member must be ‘European’ in the normative sense, as 
explicitly noted in Article 237 TEC.36 Being ‘European’ in this sense, is understood as being 
a “democratic state that respected human rights.”37 Formalized in the Treaty on European 
Union in Maastricht in 1992, these values became the official requirement for EU 
membership.38 The EU in 1999 had yet to deal with the subject of what to do if a Member 
State was found to violate these principles and how it was to be held accountable. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam, signed in October 1997 and put into force in May 1999, introduced Article 7 
 
32 Neisser, "The Schüssel Years and the European Union",188. 
33 Freeman, “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members’ Sanctions,” 
119. 
34 Schlipphak and Treib. “Playing the blame game on Brussels,” 357. 
35 Kalkner, “The EU14’s “Sanctions” Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense,” 3. 
36 Augustín José Menéndez, “Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” JCMS Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 480. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
Larissa Sophie Wiegelmann                                      EU change response to populist radical right  
 14 
to the Treaty of European Union, which stated that if a member state was found to be 
noncompliant with EU values, it could lead to the suspension of certain rights.39 Maria-
Christina Solacolu argues that when the Austrian government was formed in February 2000, 
the EU was unable to apply Article 7 as the coalition government had not been proven to 
have actually violated any law or principles. Solaculu contends that this is the reasoning for 
the diplomatic sanctions against Austria by the other member states; a symbolic gesture of 
EU values, rather than anything concretely punitive.40  
 
The application of Article 7 was deemed unlawful, however there was another legal 
aspect being discussed within the EU. In June of 1999, the Cologne European Council 
announced that a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was to be 
established.41 Composed by a variation of different actors, ranging from agents of national 
governments to the European Commission, the final agreed upon Charter consisted of “54 
articles that spell out the civic, political and social rights of European citizens under Union 
law.”42 However, as Augustín José Menéndez notes, the status of the Charter concerning its 
legality was initially still undecided and despite the European Commission, Council and 
Parliament formally declaring the Charter on 7. December 2000, it had been agreed upon that 
“the final status of the Charter would not be clarified until the next intergovernmental 
conference, scheduled for 2004.”43 Menéndez argues that the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union was invoked during the ‘Austrian crisis’ in 2000 despite unofficial 
legality. He concludes that the Charter should be seen and used as a guideline to enrich the 
 
39 Maria-Cristina Solacolu, “Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – past, present and future.” 
Curierul judiciar 13:76-82 (2018): 76. 
40 Ibid: 77. 
41 Augustín José Menéndez, “Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” JCMS Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 471. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid: 472. 
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application process of Article 7 TEU. The ‘Austrian Crisis’ in 2000 clearly initiated a 
conversation within the EU on the issue of “a serious and persistent breach of fundamental 
rights in a Member State” and the role of Article 7 TEU.44 Both Solacolu and Menéndez 
agree that the Austrian dilemma meant that change was introduced to improve monitoring the 
protection of fundamental rights with the European Parliament, through an introduction of 
annual reporting within the EU on this matter.45 The literature on this matter is relatively 
dense and technical as the authors assess the legality of the sanctions and the impact of the 
‘Austrian crisis’ on Article 7 TEU yet, there appears to be a clear consensus on both these 
matters.   
 
The ‘Austrian Crisis’ undoubtedly started a dialogue within the EU on how to 
approach such a situation in the future. This is demonstrated in a report from the European 
Parliament in October 2000, shortly after the Austrian sanctions were lifted, on the 
constitutionalizing of the European treaties.46 The report contains the motion for a resolution 
to found a European constitution which encompasses the previous European treaties in order 
to provide “the citizens of Europe with a reference text and simplifying the rules governing 
the European institutions…”47 The motion repeatedly emphasizes both the principles of the 
EU and the recently developed Charter of Fundamental Rights as motivations for such a 
constitution, notably due to the approaching expansion of the EU of 10 states.48 Although 
Austria is not explicitly mentioned, it is cited that the “respect for fundamental rights within 
the European Union has become a major political issue, not only owing to the Charter of 
 
44 Augustín José Menéndez, “Chartering Europe: Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” JCMS Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002): 482  
45 Solacolu, “Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – past, present and future,” 79. 
46 European Parliament, Committee of Constitutional Affairs, “Report on the constitutionalizing of the 
Treaties.” (Oct 12. 2000) available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2000-0289+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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Fundamental Rights, but also because of the concern to which the inclusion of an extreme 
right-wing party in the government of one of the member states has given rise.”49 
Considering the timing of said report, it is safe to assume that it is referring to the rise of the 
FPÖ. Such a constitution never materialized, however this report indicates increased 
awareness concerning the possibility of the rise of political parties, whose ideology might not 
compliment EU values, within member states and the necessity for stronger guidance and 
comprehendible legislation to turn to such contexts.  
 
From this section it is clear that the sanctions imposed on Austria, legally-speaking, 
were not an EU action. So why is it referred to as one in the vast majority of the literature? 
As Besselink points out, the sanctions imposed on Austria in 2000 were not authorised from 
the European Union or Commission but were bilateral sanctions from the remaining 14 
member states.50 However, it was an effort undoubtedly co-ordinated by the European Union, 
with the Portuguese presidency of the EU pressing the other 14 member states for a 
consensus.51 Calingaert builds on this argument and states that after being unable to punish 
Austria legally under any EU treaties, the 14 member states acted only formally as 
independent governments while in reality still blatantly implementing an EU position.52 
Schipphak and Treib agree and state that “legally speaking, these steps were bilateral rather 
than official EU measures, but it was clear that de facto they were politically endorsed by 
official EU institutions.”53 Matthew Happold appears to be the only exception. He claims that 
the sanctions were in fact not led by the European Commission but by the member states, 
who were eager to express their disapproval of the political ideology of the FPÖ but also to 
 
49 Ibid.  
50 L. Besselink, “The Bite, the Bark and Howl: Article 7 TEU,” 8. 
51 Menéndez, “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” 483. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Schlipphak and Treib. “Playing the blame game on Brussels,” 356. 
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impose normative standards.54 Happold describes the EU as the arbitrator of the crisis, rather 
than an actor. He focuses primarily on the legality of the actions of the 14 member states. 
Although the 14 member state’s fear may have been misplaced as no human rights abuses 
had occurred in Austria and there was no “evidence that the Freedom Party intends to 
overthrow the existing political order,” yet Happold argues that the members states acted 
fully within their legal rights by cutting bilateral ties with Austria.55 There is no contending 
that the member states’ were fully within their legal rights to cut ties, as this is the right of 
every sovereign nation. Happold’s argument does have merit as it was the bilateral relations 
which were severed rather than those within the framework of the EU.  
 
When deliberating whether the sanctions were an EU or a member state action, it is 
imperative to consider the perception and reaction of the Austrian public. Perception, 
however misdirected, often directs reality and as is evident by EU appraisals taken in 
October-November 1999, before the sanctions, and again in April-May 2000, after them, 
approval ratings for EU membership decreased significantly in Austria.56 In the report, it was 
stated that this drop in popularity was undoubtedly due to the sanctions imposed. This 
indicates that Austria held the EU accountable, rather than the individual member states, for 
the political consequences of their elections and is therefore a strong argument to refer to 
them as EU sanctions. I believe this, in addition to the arguments made by academics listed, 
is enough to confidently justify the sanctions as an EU action and refer to them as such.  
 
What is the populist radical right?  
 
 
54 Happold, Matthew. "Fourteen against One,"  963. 
55 Ibid: 96. 
56 European Commission, “Eurobarometer: die öffentliche meinung in der Europäischen Union.” 
Bericht Nr. 53, (October 2000) available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_de.pdf. 
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We now move to the understanding of the politics in which this thesis is engaging with. To 
appropriately answer the overarching question of this thesis, it is vital to conceptualize the 
FPÖ, and their European counterparts, as a political party. This topic has been intensely 
debated among historians and political scientists and a clear consensus on how to describe 
such parties appears to be absent. It is important to note that these parties themselves 
customarily reject the many labels placed upon them, including; radical right-wing, radical 
right, neo-fascist, fascist, populist, right-wing populist, far right, new right and anti-
immigrant.57 This section is going to examine the literature on the topic and rationalise the 
choice to use the term ‘populist radical right’ throughout this thesis.   
 
An expert on the matter, Paul Hainsworth outlines the decadal changes of language 
used to categorize the populist radical right and how the terminology coincides with the 
evolution of the parties themselves. From being tagged as neo-fascist in the 1960s to right-
wing extremist in the 1970s, the 1980s proved to be a pivotal turning point as a number of 
new populist radical right parties emerged, including the FPÖ.58 Although the party had 
existed since the 1950s, it had reinvented itself under the leadership of Jörg Haider in the 
1980s transitioning from its standing as a liberal party to a radical, populist group. 
Hainsworth argues that this proves to show the flexibility of these parties to adopt “winning 
formulas based on populism and on economic (as opposed to racial) arguments against the 
presence of immigrants.”59 In his research, Hainsworth has successfully described and 
identified subtle links between the FPÖ and fascism, highlighting the many instances in 
which Haider keenly trivialized or made inflammatory comments of praise regarding 
 
57 Paul Hainsworth, The Extreme Right in Western Europe. (London: Routledge, 2008): 9. 
58 Ibid: 8. 
59 Ibid: 18. 
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Austria’s Nazi history.60 Hainsworth’s work shows insight and gives detailed explanation for 
varying terminology however, it is unclear why he himself, labels the FPÖ, and their 
European counterparts, as extreme right parties. He does mention that some researchers in the 
field, among them Pippa Norris, are uncomfortable with the terms fascist, neo-fascist or 
extreme right as it implies that such parties are accepting of violence and in opposition to the 
idea of liberal democracy.61 What is missing is Hainsworth’s justification for his chosen 
vocabulary. Despite that the ideology of the FPÖ is seeping with xenophobia, anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and a mistrust for the establishment, they are still a democratic party participating in 
a democratic system. Additionally, they have not explicitly advocated or called for violent 
measures in the past. David Art concurs and points to the report of the three wise men which 
concluded that the FPÖ was not disassembling Austrian democracy, nor was it trying to.62 
Other populist radical right parties which have succeeded in securing a position in minority 
governments, such as in Norway or Denmark have neither.63 For these reasons, I do not find 
the term extreme right justified to describe the FPÖ.  
 
In her book, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Pippa Norris 
outlines her argument for her choice of terminology. She dismisses the ‘new right’ as too 
economically focused, neo-fascist as too ideologically different in regards to capitalism, and 
the extreme right as an implication that the political party referenced as is outside the political 
spectrum of democracy and are willing and able to use direct violence or commit terrorist 
activities.64 David Art also prefers the term ‘radical right’ and identifies nativism, also 
 
60 Ibid: 16. 
61 Ibid: 19. 
62 David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western 
Europe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 8. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Pippa Norris, Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005): 45. 
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mentioned by Mudde, as the radical rights cultural component and neoliberalism as their 
economic one, though Art does acknowledge that the former frequently trumps the latter.65 
Moreover Art contends that although other parties on the political spectrum approve of 
ideological elements of the populist radical right, the striking difference is in the language 
they choose to express it.66 Mainstream parties have a tendency to be cautious in how they 
articulate themselves, whereas the populist radical right often uses inflammatory language.67  
 
In the first chapter of his work, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cas Mudde 
provides a conceptual framework for the politics of parties such as the FPÖ.68 Another expert 
in this subject, Mudde outlines the difficult history of labelling the populist radical right.69 
Mudde chooses for the term the ‘populist radical right’ for the FPÖ and cites the term as 
being both broad and specific enough to encompass a number of parties on the right.70 I 
concur with his argument that the “anti-immigrant” label infers this is the sole issue on their 
agenda.71 Undoubtedly, whilst anti-immigrant is a central tenet of these political parties, it is 
not the only matter with which they concern themselves with. As David Art argues, such 
parties additionally oppose and feel the obligation to protect their nations from European 
integration and globalization.72  
 
Although it is glaringly obvious that there is still a lack of consensus regarding the 
terminology, for the purpose of this thesis I will use Mudde’s language to define the FPÖ and 
 
65 Art, “Inside the Radical Right,” 11. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007): 12. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid: 30. 
71 Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” 19. 
72 Art, “Inside the Radical Right,” 11.  
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others like it; a populist radical right party.73 I am convinced by Norris’ argument for using 
the term radical right as it “avoids prejudging the programmatic content of or rhetorical 
appeal” of such parties.74 David Art reasons that populism is not appropriate simply due to 
the notion that populists normally claim they are the common people’s voice and not part of 
the political elite.75 As a number of populist radical right parties have enjoyed significant 
political success in recent years and been part of minority or coalition governments in a 
number of European countries, the populist label is difficult to defend.76 Though the value of 
Art’s argument is clear, I believe that Mudde’s addition of populist is relevant in the case of 
this thesis. As this thesis is concentrating on the EU’s response towards the rise of the FPÖ, I 
have to adopt the most appropriate terminology. Considering the political style of the FPÖ, 
especially considering its leadership of both Haider and Strache, I feel that the ‘populist 
radical right’ is the most fitting.  
 
Literature on the Austrian sanctions  
 
We have investigated the literature regarding the role of the EU in the Austrian elections of 
2000, classified the political parties we are discussing and now we must turn to the literature 
on the impact of the EU response. As demonstrated in the first section of this literature 
review, the decision to impose EU-coordinated sanctions on Austria was a legally and 
ethically ambiguous choice. It is not surprising therefore that there is a significant amount of 
literature concerning the 1999 election results of Austria and the controversial EU-sanctions 
against one of its own members. The approval of the sanctions within Austria is surely the 
least contested subject within this topic as there is little question that they were deeply 
 
73 Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” 42. 
74 Norris, “Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market,” 46. 
75 Art, “Inside the Radical Right,” 11. 
76 Ibid. 
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unpopular. Gerda Falker argues that although the sanctions were initially implemented as a 
preventative measure for future FPÖ actions, they did not generate the desired effects of the 
EU governments, instead creating an ‘us versus them’ sentiment in Austria which only 
further played into the populist radical right Eurosceptic rhetoric.77 Jamie Sander concurs by 
claiming that the EU sanctions provided the FPÖ with “perfect propaganda material.”78 
Furthermore, the sanctions from 2000 brought unnecessary humiliation and possible 
resentment to Austrian citizens who themselves had not voted for FPÖ.79 Heather Berit 
Freeman approaches the topic contrarily and views the consequences of the sanctions 
ultimately as a positive.80 She claims that although the sanctions were a difficult pill to 
swallow, the EU decision to have the “three wise men” investigate Austria’s democratic 
structures to ensure no human right violations could occur validated Austria’s standing as a 
democratic nation.81 An optimistic claim yet I find it unconvincing as not only did the EU’s 
decision to report on Austria’s democratic competences ostracize the Austrian public but 
more importantly there was no evidence that these democratic structures were not already in 
place.   
 
With a minority number of objections, there appears to be a consensus among 
scholars that the EU-coordinated sanctions were not only an unclear but a rash and 
unprecedented decision. American scholar Michael Calingaert discusses the implications of 
the unrestrained decision of the 14 member-states of the EU to ostracise one of their own as 
 
77 Falker “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense,” 4. 
78 Sanders, Jamie. “The Freedom Party of Austria and the Rise of Euroscepticism.” (July 2012). 
https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/31/the-freedom-party-of-austria-and-the-rise-of-europscepticism/. 
79 Falker “The EU14’s ‘Sanctions’ Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense,” 3. 
80 Freeman, “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members’ Sanctions,”  
124. 
81 Ibid.  
 
Larissa Sophie Wiegelmann                                      EU change response to populist radical right  
 23 
establishing “ground-rules in an entirely new area.”82 It seems that scholars often outline the 
impact of these sanctions, rather than the reasons why this might have happened? What was 
surprising to me when reading through the literature was the absence of notice towards the 
unequal treatment of Austria, with only a few exceptions. As mentioned in the previous 
section of this literature review, further populist radical right parties have been successful in 
national elections, either in coalitions or in minority governments without consequence by the 
EU. Heinrich Neisser, Schlipphak and Trieb all point to the 1994 Italian national elections 
when Berlusconi formed a government coalition with the neo-fascist Alleanza Nazionale 
(AN).83  In response, the European Parliament released a statement urging member states to 
emphasize the principles and values of the European Community and Italy’s duty to respect 
them.84 No bilateral sanctions were discussed. Only Neisser highlighted the hypocrisy when a 
year after the Austrian sanctions, Berlusconi once again formed a government composed of 
the AN and the populist radical right Lega Nord (LN).85 Discussion of sanctions were held 
within the EU, however to no avail, displaying an odd double standard.86 It would be slightly 
more understandable if Italy did not also have the very troubling history of fascism. This 
brings into question whether Austria’s small size and comparatively lesser economic 
significance within the EU allowed it to be somewhat of an experimental subject.   
 
Considering Austria’s problematic past with Nazism, the notion of the FPÖ, a party 
that had been accused of sympathizing with Nazism and preaching ‘Fremdenfeindlichkeit’ on 
 
82 Michael Calingaert, Calingaert, Michael. “Sanctions Against Austria Pose Troubling Questions for 
the EU,” European Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2000) 
https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/18-european-affairs/spring-2000/762-sanctions-against-
austria-pose-troubling-questions-for-the-eu 
83 Schlipphak and Treib, “Playing the blame game on Brussels,” 353. 
84 Neisser, "The Schüssel Years and the European Union," 190. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid.  
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multiple occasions, being in government was understandably worrying.87 Despite the national 
rhetoric of being Hitler’s ‘first victims,’ an overwhelming majority in Austria supported the 
Nazi regime at the time of the Anschluss in 1938, a historical fact that Austrian society 
consistently downplays.88 Not to mention that many high-ranking officials in the Nazi 
regime, like Hitler himself, were Austrian.89 Heather Berit Freeman argues the decision to 
implement sanctions was primarily moral; “many officials feared that inaction by Austria’s 
EU partners would be read as approval of Haider’s controversial views.”90 Haider was known 
nationally and internationally for his many contentious statements. Haider “described Nazi 
concentration camps as ‘punishment centres’, praised Hitler's ‘orderly employment policies’ 
and referred to Waffen SS veterans as ‘decent men of character.’”91 Bernd Schlipphak and 
Oliver Treib argue that the 14 EU member states’ concern lay primarily with Haider’s 
reputation for incendiary comments about minorities and his inclination to downplay the 
atrocities committed in the Nazi regime, not with the official political positions of the FPÖ.92 
This is a warranted argument which could rationalise the questionable decision to implement 
sanctions in 2000 yet it fails to comprehensively explain the change in the EU response to the 
2017 Austrian election results. Focusing solely on the controversial character and influence 
of Haider is simply not satisfactory in explaining why the EU has changed its response as it 
overlooks the FPÖ as a political party itself and more importantly it disregards the dramatic 
change in political context.  
 
 
87 fremdenfeindlichkeit means xenophobia in German 
88 Doron Rabinovici, "Politik Als Volksbrauch." The German Quarterly 75, Vol. 75, No. 1 (2002): 2 
89 Happold, "Fourteen against One,” 955. 
90 Freeman, “Austria: The 1999 Parliament Elections and the European Union Members’ Sanctions,” 
110. 
91 Happold, "Fourteen against One,” 955. 
92 Schlipphak and Treib, “Playing the blame game on Brussels,” 356. 
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The sanctions implemented by the EU damaged Austria’s reputation politically and 
had lasting consequences which took months to repair, in particular regarding their bilateral 
relationship with Belgium and France. Belgium not only temporarily ceased military 
cooperation with Austria, but they also called for a national wide boycott of citizens spending 
their holidays there.93 Cultural exchanges, such as student exchange programs were also cut 
by both France and Belgium.94 For many Austrians, this was seen as deeply humiliating and 
as a result approval ratings for the EU drastically fell, while support for the newly elected 
government increased.95 Bernd Schipphak and Oliver Trieb investigate EU interventions in 
the case of both Austria in 2000 and Hungary in 2015 and the ‘blame game’ that followed 
both.96 Schippak and Trieb identify the ‘blame game on Brussels’ as an effective method of 
shifting blame from domestic actors to the European Union with little negative political costs 
for the former.97 Schippak and Trieb label the EU interventions as precarious and comment 
that the ‘blame game’ is often counterproductive and leads to the strengthening of domestic 
actors.98 This is a very convincing argument, especially considering the EU’s decision to not 
act similarly towards the Berlusconi’s coalition in 1994 and then again in 2001. It is easy to 
see how the Austrian public felt victimized by the EU and its member states. This proceeded 
to fuel the nationalistic sentiment that Austria was being treated unjustly by the EU and was 
being subjected to international interference, which was undoubtedly taken advantage of by 
the newly elected government. Equally convincing is Schippak and Trieb’s conviction that 
the EU’s hesitant approach to Hungary and other countries in the following years was due to 
the learning experience of the Austrian sanctions and the unintended counterproductive 
 
93 Neisser, "The Schüssel Years and the European Union," 187. 
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consequences which followed it.99 Yet this assertion, similarly to their argument that the 
EU’s sanctions were pointed at Haider, neglects the importance of context when used to 
explain the lack of reaction in 2017.  
 
There appears to be little literature which examines exactly what this thesis is going to 
investigate; why the difference in the reaction of the EU between the 1999 and 2017 Austrian 
elections despite the same electoral outcome. The difference in the international outrage 
following the results was detected by the press, however was quickly forgotten and not 
analysed sufficiently.100 It is evident from the first section of the literature review that the EU  
did alter how Article 7 was to be used in the future as a result of the ‘Austrian Crisis.’ 
However, this does not solely explain the change in response as Article 7 was not formally 
invoked. This is clearly not a matter of simple legal reform within the Treaty on European 
Union. The final section of this literature review demonstrates that the majority of academics 
concerned with the subject, with the exception of Freeman, concur that the sanctions were an 
ill-thought out decision and resulted in undesired consequences. However, this conclusion is 
unsatisfactory in answering the question why the EU did not respond to the Austrian election 
results in 2017. Considering the substantial changes the EU has gone through politically, 
economically and culturally within this period of time, the assertion that an EU response (like 
the one in 2000) is simply a poor idea is too passive a conclusion.  
 
Contribution to EU literature  
 
 
99 Ibid. 353 
100 “The Guardian View on the Austrian elections: an old threat in a new guise,” The Guardian, 16. 
October 2017. 
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The rise of the populist radical right and the rash response to the ‘Austrian crisis’ of 2000 by 
the EU has been sufficiently studied and the literature concerning it reflects this. As 
mentioned, literature regarding the 2017 Austrian elections is considerably more limited. 
While this event is much more recent, it was nonetheless surprising to find a huge lack of 
comparison on the EU’s response. The literature examined paints the EU’s response to the 
Austrian electoral results in 2000 as a largely isolated event, with little focus on why this 
decision was made in first place with the exception of pointing to Haider. Much of the 
literature, concerning the different legal, social and political elements, proved to be slightly 
unsatisfactory in arguing why the EU decided upon such an action. Legally unfounded, it 
appeared destined to create animosity socially and politically, rather than reinforcing any 
kind of European solidarity. There appears to be a definite gap for comprehensive academic 
literature to fill regarding this topic. Bearing that in mind, this thesis also does not tackle this 
question; rather it contextualizes the EU’s response to both the 2000 and 2017 Austrian 
elections and shifts the focus away from the events themselves to the conditions in which 
they took place. This is not to say that there has been little research on the rise of the populist 
radical right in Europe, as the secondary section of the literature reviews proves otherwise. 
However, the direct link to the effect of the rise of the populist radical right upon the EU is 
not nearly as thorough. Repeatedly, it is important to note that this is most likely due to its 
contemporary nature and I have no doubt academic literature on the matter will intensify with 
time.  
 
This thesis focuses on exploring the disparity between these two notable elections in 
Austria in order to investigate why the response has changed. This is particularly relevant as 
Austria’s populist radical right party is frequently considered one of the most successful ones 
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of its kind and moreover one of the pioneers of such politics in Europe. 101 Yet this topic has 
been insufficiently explored academically. Likely this is due to Austria’s relatively small 
size, geographically but also economically, and their resulting dependency on the EU. 
Although the FPÖ is a Eurosceptic populist radical right party, most can safely assume it is 
not a threat to the EU comparable in scope to United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
and therefore has generated significantly less attention.  
 
While this thesis is using two Austrian elections as points of reference, the 
developments within this period are international and the international trends and events that 
occurred affected almost all countries in the EU to varying degrees. This alteration in the 
response demonstrates that the EU itself has undergone changes within this period of time. It 
sheds light to the shift within the EU concerning its principles and values, once rigidly 
enforced and codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, they now 
represent a rather idealistic but unrealistic notion of the past. The changes and crises which 
the EU has endured, from the 2004 enlargement to Brexit, in the these 17 years has 
understandably resulted in a shift of priorities and focus. From debating and conceptualizing 
what it is to be “European” in the normative sense, to more pragmatic management and 
cooperation to avoid the loss of any further member states. Within this time, the populist 
radical right in member states have thrived not only in Europe but on an international scale, 
as can be seen with the election of Donald Trump in the United States of America. On the 
global scale, the EU presents itself as an actor against this populist right-wing wave yet it 
continues to be faced and threatened with it internally. Indeed, the lack of response to the 
 
101 Birgit Sauer and Edma Ajanovic, “Hegemonic Discourses of Difference and Inequality: Right-
Wing Organisations in Austria” in The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Popular Shifts and ‘Othering’ 
edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani, Annie Benveniste (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 2016): 81.  
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Austrian elections in 2017 signal a form of acceptance from the EU. It is imperative to 
analyse the mainstreaming of the populist radical right in the EU which has resulted in this 
acceptance.  
 
Analysis  
 
The previous sections have looked at how the EU sanctions after the Austrian elections in 
2000 itself came about and the consequences it entailed. Now we must investigate the wider 
context of this thesis topic by studying the events that occurred in the EU in-between 2000 
and 2017 and analyse their impact on how the populist radical right was perceived among 
voters and within the EU itself. Since the turn of the century to present day, the EU has 
expanded institutionally but also territorially. In 2000, the EU consisted of 14 nation-states 
and by 2017 the number of nation-states had doubled. Shortly after the enlargement process 
which predominantly took place in 2004, the EU suffered the European sovereign debt crisis 
in 2008, causing substantial economic damage to the European project leading to an increase 
of Euroscepticism. The populist radical right already showed an increase in electoral success 
in 2014, briefly before the migrant crisis hit Europe. Due to a combination of government 
mismanagement and unfortunate circumstances, the member states who had suffered most 
under the debt crisis now found themselves overwhelmed with a flow of refugees. These 
challenges provided the optimum opportunity for the populist radical right to flourish through 
their anti-establishment, Eurosceptic and nationalist political ideology. This cumulated in the 
United Kingdom, leading to a successful referendum to leave the EU who was now 
confronted with the unprecedented task of negotiating an exit. It is not controversial to say 
that the European project had suffered a great number of challenges and crises in-between 
2000 and 2017. These challenges not only served as distractions for the EU but also as 
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aforementioned, led to the rise in the populist radical right across Europe. Due to the 
interrelated nature of the events and trends occurring in this period, there appeared no clear 
choice on how to coherently organize this analysis. I decided for a rather simple however 
effective chronological approach to outline the above-mentioned events within our timeframe 
and subsequently analyse their impact on the rise of the populist radical right within Europe 
and as a result the change of response from the EU to such parties.  
 
The Enlargement of the EU  
 
 
We start with the 2004 enlargement of the EU. This saw the integration of Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
and finally Malta after completing the long application process. At first glance it appeared to 
be a joyous occasion. Opinion polls conducted by the European Commission in 2002 indicate 
that a majority in all member states, to varying degrees, voted in favour of the impending EU 
enlargement.102 Zsuzsa Csergo and James Goldgeier explain that in the post-Cold War world, 
it was believed within the EU that an eastward expansion in membership would stabilize the 
region and transcend Western principles to former Soviet satellite states.103 This ran parallel 
with the modernist theory of nationalism which predicts that improving the socioeconomic 
development of a nation decreases nationalism.104 However, as we see in the years to come, if 
the objective was to curb nationalism, the enlargement of 2004 undoubtedly failed. Naturally, 
with the expansion came certain anxieties regarding its ramifications on Europe. While the 
majority of the voters in the member states were optimistic about the enlargement the report 
 
102 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 132/2, carried out by Eos Gallup Europe upon 
request from the European Commission Directorate General “Enlargement” (November 2002): 28. 
103 Zsuzsa Csergo and James M. Goldgeier. "Nationalist Strategies and European 
Integration." Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004): 22. 
104 Ibid: 22. 
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also revealed that a majority thought it would now be more difficult to take decisions in an 
enlarged EU (76%) and that this expansion will be expensive for their own country (65%).105 
Csergo and Goldgeier concur and argue that euro-scepticism among nationalists increases as 
the European Union continues to incorporate societies who are culturally different and the 
original members, the Westerners, pursue protectionist nationalism as many consider the 
assimilation of Eastern states too costly.106 Within Austria itself, anxieties were high as many 
projected that the enlargement of the EU would directly impact the country. It was believed 
that there would be an excess of labour market supply as cheap workers from the East would 
arrive and this expansion would lead to an increase in crime rates.107 In addition, many 
Austrians believed that the Eastern states in question were too underdeveloped to join and the 
scale of expansion was too immense a challenge for the EU.108 
 
In the EU reports, apprehension concerning the expansion of the Schengen borders 
and the immigration issues this may entail were also underlined. 65% were convinced that the 
enlargement would result in citizens from the newly added member states coming to live in 
their own country; 61% were persuaded that drug trafficking and fighting against crime 
would become increasingly difficult and 53% stated that controlling illegal immigration will 
also prove to become more difficult.109 This report’s findings concluded that, “European 
Union citizens still have doubts about the effects on a personal scale.”110 The results 
concerning the immigration are particularly pertinent as this not only plays into the advantage 
of the populist radical right; it also shows the beginning of the accelerating discussion 
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concerning immigration. A little over a decade later, this was to become the paramount 
concern of the EU.  
 
As the report demonstrates, EU enlargement came with both optimism and 
anticipation. The PopuList, an overview of the performance of populist and Eurosceptic 
parties across the political spectrum since 1989 (supported by the Amsterdam Institute for 
Social Science Research, The Guardian, the Amsterdam Centre for European studies and the 
ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy) provides data that I will refer to 
throughout this analysis.111 Their data finds that 2004 marked the beginning of an upheaval in 
support for far-right populism in Europe.112 This was supported by the European 
parliamentary elections the same year. These proved to be successful for varying degrees of 
Eurosceptic parties, opposed to further European integration under the factions of 
Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) and Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN).113 In 
combination with representatives who fall under the Non-attached Members category, 
including the FPÖ MEPs elected, right-wing Eurosceptics comprised of an estimated 10% of 
the MEPs elected that year.114 These results indicate that although a majority may have 
viewed the enlargement of the EU as a positive action, the apprehension it created had 
significant political consequences.   
 
 
111 Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., 
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112 I use the term far-right populist when referring to the data from PopuList only because it is what 
they use. Having read their definitions and looking at the graphs for individual member states, it is 
clear that the FPÖ and other parties which I have classified as populist radical right, is here being 
classified as far-right populist.   
113 European Parliament, European election results 2004. (July 20, 2004) available at 
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The enlargement of 2004 and the later integration of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
in the EU not only heightened worries in already existing member states, it also transformed 
the political landscape of the EU. Csergo and Goldgeier forecasted in 2004, that EU 
integration of said states would not diminish nationalism; instead it would merely alter 
“domestic and international opportunity structures for nationalist pursuits of political-cultural 
coherence.”115 This turned out to be the case in the instance of most notably Poland and 
Hungary. As mentioned briefly in the methodology section of this thesis, the nationalistic 
governments of newly admitted EU members of Poland and Hungary have proved the most 
recent headache for the EU with regards to its values. Actions by these governments 
constituted discussion in both cases within the European Commission and Parliament 
respectively. In 2017, the Polish government was found guilty of breaching EU values and 
Article 7 was triggered properly for the first time in EU history. 116 The European Parliament 
quickly determined that the Hungarian government was similarly breaching EU values in 
2018.117 These cases are ongoing but the objective in mentioning them is to demonstrate that 
the shift to the right wing of politics within the EU occurred through both in senior member 
states dissatisfied with the enlargement and in younger ones.  
 
The expansion to the East significantly reshaped the EU politically and although the 
EU has been faced with criticism and trepidation since its existence, such a monumental 
enlargement was guaranteed to intensify this. This uneasiness benefited the populist radical 
right in Europe, as most of such parties opposed further expansion and any shortcomings 
from the EU regarding management validated their Eurosceptic rhetoric. Within our 
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timeframe, it marks the starting point of increased dissatisfaction with the EU among the 
citizens of its member states and as a result the strengthening of the populist radical right. 
The enlargement, although it is frequently regarded as one of the EU’s success stories, 
inadvertently contributed to the eventual mainstreaming of such parties over a decade later 
and subsequentially the change in response from the EU to such parties.  
 
The Global Financial Crisis hits Europe: Eurocrisis 
 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis, also famously known as the Eurocrisis, followed after 
the global financial crisis of 2008. Certain EU countries found themselves unable to re-
finance or re-pay their national government debt, requiring third-party institutions to provide 
financial assistance and oversee spending in these countries. This severely hurt the economies 
of not only the countries unable to pay off their government debt, such as Greece and 
Portugal, but due to the inter-connected nature of the eurozone, all other members. 2009 
proved to be the worst year of the crisis, with the average GDP of the 27 EU member states 
dropping by 6% (although it should be noted that the severity varied regionally).118 Differing 
levels of economic impact also tested European unity on the matter of how to effectively 
tackle it.119 The crisis led to high numbers of unemployment and growing dissatisfaction in 
national political systems, and the EU as a whole.120 The impact of the financial crisis has 
lingered and left a legacy of high debt, lower levels of consumption, and a regression of the 
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middle class in Europe and economic recovery has proven to be slow.121 History has shown a 
strong European precedent between depressed economics and the rise of populist or extreme 
political parties, the most dramatic unfolding in the 1930s. The aftermath of the Eurocrisis 
proved to be no different. Francesco Nicoli’s study investigated 108 elections across Europe 
between 2008 and 2015 to analyse the relation between distressed economies and the rise of 
Eurosceptic parties, repeatedly a key feature in the populist radical right.122 His research 
found a clear link, among others, between the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties and the 
long-lasting economic effects of the crisis, showing that the former benefitted from the 
latter.123  
Data from the PopuList indicates that the direct effect of the Eurocrisis on the voter 
increase for the far-right populist was less than the enlargement but substantial in comparison 
to the years previous. 124  It is not too surprising as to why. The Eurocrisis and the discord it 
brought provided the populist radical right with the favourable conditions to advance their 
ideology based on anti-establishment, Euroscepticism, nationalism and anti-immigration. 
This surge in popularity, similarly to the enlargement of 2004, contributed to legitimizing 
such parties and aided in normalizing them.  
The Migrant Crisis in 2015  
 
 
It would frankly be impossible to outline the rise of the populist radical right without 
discussing the migrant crisis, since this undoubtedly had the largest impact on their success in 
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the following years.125 In 2015, the already ever-increasing number of asylum applications in 
the 28 states reached its peak with close to 1.3 million asylum seekers.126 Refugees were 
fleeing from Muslim majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa, predominantly 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.127 Th number of asylum applicants had been steadily on the rise 
since 2011 as a consequence of the Arab Spring, which saw the overthrow of a number of 
governments in the Islamic World, including Syria.128 The anti-government protests quickly 
escalated into a brutal civil war in the Arabic state, leaving millions displaced. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to partially open the German borders meant many 
refugees would choose the Balkan route in order to make their way North.129 From Greece, 
through the Balkans, many would finish their journey in Austria or travel through to make 
their way to Munich. In 2015, Austria had one of the highest numbers of asylum requests in 
the EU.130  
Initially, the mood and aid provided was overwhelmingly high with citizens in both 
Austria and Germany welcoming refugees at train stations.131 As the summer of 2015 went 
on and the flow of refugees showed little signs of stopping, the temperament of many 
European citizens towards migrants began to change. The migrant crisis also proved to sow 
further discord among the 28 member states with regards to how to manage this crisis. The 
Southeast region of Europe, used as a transit for many refugees, became increasingly less 
impressed by Merkel’s welcoming tune. Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia and Croatia 
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were among those and consequently implemented measures to strengthen their national 
security in an attempt to curb the influx of refugees.132 The allocation of the incoming 
refugees and refugee quotas for member states, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, 
became a great source of tension within the EU.133 The atmosphere across Europe turned 
progressively sour, as a number of deadly terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State 
occurred in the following years, creating suspicion and fear towards immigrants coming from 
Muslim countries.  
The concerns which came about as a result outlived the migrant crisis itself. A report 
from the European Parliament looking at Regional Development noted that in 2016 migration 
and terrorism were seen as the most vital issues facing the EU by a large margin, surpassing 
the EU’s economic situation, national public finances and unemployment. 134 Additionally, 
the report cited that trust in both national institutions and the EU were substantially low with 
only 36% of EU citizens trusting the EU itself and as little as 31% trusting their own national 
government.135 In their essay, Vicki Birchfield and Geoffrey Harris point to the “capability-
expectations gap” of the EU and the reoccurring problem that many EU citizens were feeling, 
particularly in relation to the refugee crisis and migration, often seeing the EU as insufficient 
at making appropriate decisions leading the public to turn to their national leaders.136 As 
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expected, the PopuList data shows a significant increase of votes for far-right populist parties, 
only to steadily rise as the years progress.137 There is also a sharp increase in populism on the 
left flank of the political spectrum, although the total numbers of votes are merely a fraction 
of the far-right populist, demonstrating a considerable shift from centre politics.  
 
The populist radical right once again benefited from yet another European crisis as 
anti-immigration, primarily anti-Muslim immigration, became the core of many such parties 
message. The populist radical right and the extreme right has historically and continuously 
pushed an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality.138 In the early 1990s it was becoming progressively 
evident that Islam had become the new ‘them’.139 The FPÖ followed this trend in the early 
2000s. Farid Hafez points to an interesting paradox; the FPÖ and the Sverigedemokraterna 
(Swedish Democrats), who both have historical links to Nazism and therefore antisemitism, 
have used Islamophobia to distance themselves from this past and choose a new more 
‘acceptable’ scapegoat.140 The migrant crisis and the terrorist attacks which followed 
presented such parties with the conditions for such rhetoric to flourish as many Europeans 
were distressed over the economic and cultural implications. This increase in support for the 
populist radical right not only empowered them politically on a national and European level 
but it resulted in centre politics to shift to the right in an attempt to salvage support from 
voters. The ÖVP’s campaign in 2017 was evident of this as Sebastian Kurz made the subject 
matters of immigration and integration dominant, increasingly adopting policies similar to the 
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FPÖ with regards on how to tackle these.141 The migrant crisis shook the continent politically 
and as the ripple effects of such a tragic mass humanitarian crisis showed to legitimize the 
populist radical right within member states, the EU was doomed to adapt accordingly. This 
legitimization achieved as a result of the migrant crisis was to play a large role in why the EU 
changed its response to the Austrian election results in 2017, as the EU could no longer 
reprimand a political wave which had gained this volume of speed.  
 
The Mainstreaming of the Populist Radical Right  
 
A highly discussed topic in international and regional politics is the successful campaign of 
Brexit and its implications within the EU must be mentioned. In 2016, the populist radical 
right UK Independence Party (UKIP) and ironically MEP politician, Nigel Farage 
spearheaded a campaign for the UK to make the unprecedented move to leave the EU. The 
UK shocked the EU, and arguably itself, by voting in favour of doing so with 52% in a 
divisive referendum held in June 2016.142 Brexit became yet another crisis for the EU, as it 
was now faced with the reality of a member state withdrawing and the complications this 
entailed. Brexit is relevant for two major reasons. Firstly, the dissatisfaction with regards to 
the EU leading up to Brexit are largely parallel to the ones discussed above. The UK had 
often had their separable complaints about the EU, however Brexit was an accumulation of 
the growing discontent that was gaining speed across Europe. It showed the EU that 
Euroscepticism and the populist radical right was an alarming threat to its institutions and 
should not be underestimated. Secondly, Brexit became all encompassing. The massive task 
of withdrawing the UK from the EU was inevitably going to be and still proves to be an 
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endlessly complicated process with no standard of how to effectively get it done. This has 
been and still is an immense undertaking of the EU, consuming its resources and attention. 
Both of these factors are related in explaining the lack of response to the Austrian elections 
the year following Brexit. Post-Brexit, the EU had no incentive to antagonize the populist 
radical right in any of its remaining member states, many of which were also busy 
unsuccessfully leading their own campaign of leaving the EU, like they had done in 2000. 
Furthermore, the EU simply had more important and threatening matters to deal with than to 
react to one of its smaller member state’s affinity for the populist radical right. 
 
Circumstances and events were beneficial for the populist radical right, but it should 
be noted that many also learned how to adapt. Many shift from the overtly controversial 
agenda, to a seemingly more rational political program. Daphine Halikiopoulou notes that the 
populist radical right has learned how to function and generate legitimate support within an 
electoral.143 The French populist radical right party, Front National, and FPÖ are both 
prominent examples of this. Front National experienced a change in leadership, comparable 
to the FPÖ, from the overtly racist yet charismatic Jean-Marie Le Pen to his consciously 
more subtle daughter Marine Le Pen. She is credited with mainstreaming Front National’s 
political image and reputation while preserving its nationalistic, Eurosceptic and anti-
immigration roots.144 Reforming the Front National into a ‘respectable’ political party 
showed its impact in the French presidential elections in 2017 when Marine Le Pen 
successfully made it to the second round.145 Aristotle Kallis investigates the mainstreaming of 
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the radical right in European politics and correctly states that the Austrian elections of 2000 
was to be the first of many tests regarding the rise of the far-right within EU states.146 He 
points to the merging of the centre-right with the far-right as a large factor in its rise in 
Europe. Austria is no exception in this trend. As aforementioned, many credited the electoral 
success of Sebastian Kurz, the centre-right current Chancellor of Austria, and the ÖVP to 
“undermining the FPÖ’s ownership of the immigration issue, and adopting many of the 
FPÖ’s policy positions…”147  
 
The populist radical right’s ability to adapt to mainstream politics was demonstrated 
across Europe, however in the specific case of Austria the potential impact of Haider’s 
departure should be cited. As aforementioned, the FPÖ went through a change of leadership 
when the infamous Jörg Haider split from the party due to internal rivalries in 2005 and 
thereafter passed away in 2008, which led to a less contentious approach.148 Identical 
rhetoric, however packaged differently. Under the controversial leadership of Haider from 
1985-2005, the FPÖ received international recognition for its xenophobic campaigns and 
Nazi sympathizing statements. Political leadership of the FPÖ did somewhat change with the 
election of Heinz-Christian Strache. Anita Bodlos and Carolina Plescia note that “compared 
to previous campaigns, the FPÖ and its top candidate Heinz-Christian Strache refrained from 
provocative statements.”149 In order to entice a possible coalition with the ÖVP, the FPÖ 
focused on more ‘sensible’ tactics, such as publishing an economic plan.150 This change in 
leadership, alongside the increasing popularity and mainstreaming of populist radical right 
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parties can be argued to have contributed to the decision in the change of response. Strache, 
despite having his own deplorable record, was not as obnoxiously provocative as Haider. Yet, 
this argument is fragile. Despite a change in leadership, the FPÖ voter base had remained 
relatively unchanged over the years, the xenophobic message prevailed (the only 
development being that now Muslims had appeared to become the primary targets) and 
Strache himself had suffered a number of accusations and worrying scandals of affiliation 
with neo-Nazis.151 I refer to the difference in leadership and approach of the FPÖ as a factor 
which could answer this thesis question with a large amount of scepticism. Not only do the 
factors listed above show this difference to be largely superficial but primarily, as it would be 
too narrow an conclusion. This difference played a relatively insignificant role in why the EU 
changed its response to the Austrian election results in 2017 in comparison to the critical 
international elements at hand.  
 
The Populist Radical Right in the EU  
 
 
We have outlined the many crises that have occurred within the EU between 2000 and 2017. 
The enlargement of 2004 and the Eurocrisis of 2008 set the scene for the rise of the populist 
radical right. Yet, it was the migrant crisis in 2015 which proved to be the incendiary episode 
leading to the significant electoral success for the populist radical right in Europe. In the 
years leading up the 2017 Austrian elections, the politics of the individual member states had 
shifted considerably in contrast to the late 1990s. By 2014, recent European national elections 
revealed a clear shift to the right and a rise in populist radical right parties; Front National in 
France, Slovenska Demokratska Stranka in Slovenia, Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, 
 
151 Franz Fallend, Fabian Habersack, Reinhard Heinisch, “Rechtpopulismus in Österreich. Zur 
Entwicklung der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, (August 
17, 2018) available at https://www.bpb.de/apuz/274253/rechtspopulismus-in-oesterreich-zur-
entwicklung-der-fpoe?p=all#fr-footnode5. 
Larissa Sophie Wiegelmann                                      EU change response to populist radical right  
 43 
Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy, UK Independence Party, and lastly the FPÖ in Austria.152 
This rise not only impacted national governments but also inevitably seeped into the 
institutions of the EU.   
As briefly stated in the introduction, when the ÖVP-FPÖ government coalition was 
formed again in December 2017, Junker was asked how the commission was to respond. He 
responded carefully that the commission would only judge the newly elected government on 
its actions, not merely on its existence.153 Demonstrating an obvious learning curve within the 
EU, however what is striking about this document is rather the question as it is posed and by 
whom it is solicited. The enquiry was asked by Steeve Briois and Dominique Bilde, both 
members of the European Parliament and Front National. Considering both Briois and 
Bilde’s political agenda it is not all too surprising that this question was a loaded one, 
suggesting that the FPÖ’s electoral success was due to the Austrian public’s desire to curb the 
influx of migrants entering the country, a sentiment aligned with Front National’s own 
political agenda.154 Before posing the direct question of what the EU’s response was to be, 
Briois and Bilde add; “It may be recalled that when the same party joined the government in 
2000, the response was a wave of diplomatic sanctions imposed by the 14 other EU Member 
States, which constituted a breach of one of the most fundamental democratic rights, namely 
a people’s right to choose its leaders freely, with no pressure from outside.”155 This source 
illustrates a powerful difference between 2017 and 2000. The increase of voter support for 
populist radical right parties had naturally led to an increase of representatives of such parties 
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in government, on the national and European level. By 2017, there was a substantial portion 
of Eurosceptic Members of European Parliament (MEPs) sitting in European Parliament. 
From the European Parliamentary elections in 1999 to 2014, both the number of Eurosceptic 
and right-wing to far right MEPs has been on a steady increase, with both making significant 
advances in 2014.156 The elections for European Parliament in 2014 resulted in an estimated 
one-third of the 751 MEPs elected to be Eurosceptic, with the majority of those from right-
wing political parties.157 This shift in politics from within the European Union itself is 
another remarkable factor which unquestionably effected the difference in response to the 
Austrian elections. The influence of the populist radical right parties was no longer restricted 
to national matters but had made its way into the parliament of the EU. There is little chance 
that the sizeable number of populist radical right Eurosceptic MEPs were to be supportive of 
a repeat of the 2000 sanctions.  
 
Whist Euroscepticism is an important element in the ideology of the European 
populist radical right, it should be noted that it is also prevalent in left-wing European 
politics. However in the context of this thesis topic, it is particularly relevant and associated 
with the populist radical right. Throughout the events which I have outlined in the previous 
sections of this analysis, there is a strong trend which connects Euroscepticism and the 
populist radical right. All of these events outlined were used as examples of the EU 
undermining national democracies by such parties. Control over borders was dominated by 
the EU during the enlargement process due to the freedom of movement, economic control 
during the Eurocrisis and the immigration control in 2015. The populist radical right’s 
rallying cry for a return of ‘national sovereignty’ ran parallel with Euroscepticism.  
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Discussion 
 
Now we have to come back to the overarching question of this thesis; why did the EU change 
its response to the rise of the populist radical right within its member states? Among the 
literature there is clear consensus that the 2000 EU sanctions imposed upon Austria as a 
consequence of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition were ill-thought out, legally muddy and 
democratically questionable decision for the then 14 EU member states to make. If this is 
analysed as an isolated case, then the straightforward conclusion would be that this decision 
was not to be repeated in the future as it was simply a poorly considered one. However, this 
conclusion is unsatisfactory in explaining the lack of response to the Austrian electoral results 
of 2017. After all, despite the threat of the populist radical right in 2017 being a cross-
regional matter, Austria was still the only western European country with such a party 
actively sitting in government.158 To comprehensibly answer this question, we must look at 
the context and how the EU has changed politically in less than two decades. In 2017, Austria 
was no longer the only EU member state that was faced with the possibility of swearing in a 
populist radical right party into government. Unlike in 2000, this had unfortunately almost 
become an outcome to be reckoned with. In the Regional Development report 2017 for 
European Parliament, all upcoming European elections and their potential implications for 
the EU depending on the results were mapped out.159 It is briefly mentioned that the FPÖ 
advocates for a North and South division in the Eurozone, yet no mention of any EU 
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principles or values.160 In comparison to other upcoming European elections, such as the 
Italian and French, Austria was portrayed as benign.   
 
As is habitual in historiography, the answer to this thesis question is a multifaceted 
one. There are a variety of factors that have contributed to the change in response of the EU 
towards the rise of the populist radical right. To fully answer the question of why the 
difference in response we need to separate content and context. In 2000, the content of the 
sanctions were enabled by the political context yet resulted in undesirable consequences. By 
2017, the political context had shifted considerably. This thesis hopes to emphasize that 
regardless of the negative aftermath of the 2000 sanctions, in 2017 similar sanctions were not 
and would not have been considered a feasible response due to the empowering and 
legitimization of the populist radical right and as a consequence the political shift to the right 
within the EU. 
 
As the populist radical right flourishes in local and national politics, the EU is 
designed to adapt accordingly, regardless of the values and principles it has claimed onto. 
The EU is first and foremost a democratic institution and like any, it is representative of the 
people which it governs. The principles the EU claimed to hold dear in 2000, have 
diminishing value as opponents or critics of them are increasingly elected into national and 
European government. The case of Austria demonstrates a difficult balancing act and 
highlights the architectural complexities of the EU as an institution. It poses the problematic 
question of what does the EU represent? Its citizens or its values? The inconsistency revealed 
in the case of the two Austrian elections analysed in this thesis indicate that the EU is dubious 
on this matter itself.  
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Conclusion 
 
The 21st century has been a political, economic and social rollercoaster for the EU. At the 
turn of the century, the EU was no longer primarily concerned with only the economical 
aspect of the European project but the political and cultural. What does it mean to be 
European? Which values do this entail? The establishment of a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union indicate how relevant these themes used to be. As the Austrian 
election results in 2000 appeared to breach what it was to be “European,” mostly symbolic 
yet punitive sanctions were believed by the member states to be a justifiable consequence. 
These actions were conceivable as, though the populist radical right within member states 
were catching momentum and had been since the 1990s, their electoral success was relatively 
marginal. The sanctions imposed by the 14 member states illustrate that EU was preoccupied 
with creating a sense of political identity for themselves, even if it came with some 
controversy.  
 
Since 2000, the EU has been faced with a significant number of challenges and these 
have resulted in new priorities. As a result, their former ones appear somewhat idealistic and 
naive. The rapid expansion of EU borders in 2004 brought a wave of anxiety and initiated a 
sentiment of a lack of control of member states’ national sovereignty. The financial crisis of 
2008 that followed, shook not only the European but the global economy to its core. These 
events had triggered an increase in Euroscepticism and a distrust in the traditional national 
centre party politics. Populist radical right parties had already begun to profit from these 
events but their pinnacle would ensue with the migrant crisis of 2015. Exploiting the fear of 
concerned citizens, the populist radical right had found their new “acceptable” other whilst 
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gaining support in denouncing the EU for their handling of said crisis. Later events, such as 
Brexit in the following year, demonstrated how influential the rise of right wing populism in 
Europe became and how quickly the position's ideologies and arguments permeated the 
electorate.  
 
These occurrences have undoubtedly transformed the EU. They have logically shifted 
priorities away from forming any cultural or political identity to essentially surviving as an 
institution. However, more importantly within the context of this thesis question, they created 
the optimal conditions for the populist radical right to prosper and infiltrate mainstream 
national and European politics. This is what resulted in the change of response from the EU 
to the Austrian elections in 2017. This change in response, from bi-lateral sanctions to no 
punitive measures and some underwhelming critique, clearly demonstrates a major political 
devolution within Europe. The populist radical right then no longer represents a fringe group 
of European politics, but rather a serious contender for democratic success, cementing its 
place in public discourse and political acceptance next to more moderate parties largely 
accepted as mainstream. This shift is crucial to outline and understand as its political 
ramifications affect the EU, its citizens and future citizens. The passivity with which the EU 
accepted a second shift towards right wing populism in Austria serves as a valuable example 
of a dangerous precedent but is also unsurprising. The EU is a dynamic grouping, the 
institutions of which are to an extent designed for adaptation to a political context and 
climate. However, in the face of increased intolerance adaptation quickly becomes an excuse 
for passivity. It should be no surprise that silence in the face of intolerance is as damning as it 
is passive, no matter whether justified under the guise of adaption; an absence of resistance to 
the development of these ideals and their parties is equal to a taciturn endorsement and 
acceptance of their ideas as part of the European Union's political reality. 
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